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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
  
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this suit under the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act, 
plaintiff secured a default in the district court after the 
territorial government had failed to answer the complaint.  After 
a contested hearing that was limited to damages, plaintiff 
received a judgment for $25,000.  We hold that the award was a 
"judgment by default" against the government and thus proscribed 
by the Tort Claims Act.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment and remand for a trial on liability and damages. 
 Plaintiff Frank Durant was employed as a security guard 
at the Old Mill Restaurant and Sugars Night Club on St. Thomas, 
Virgin Islands.  At about 4:00 a.m. on January 14, 1990, a 
disturbance erupted among several patrons at the nightclub. 
Plaintiff managed to quell the altercation.  Shortly thereafter, 
however, defendant David Husband, an off-duty policeman employed 
by the Virgin Islands government who was also a patron at the 
nightclub, struck plaintiff on the head with a pistol and later 
fired a shot that missed him.  For his conduct at the nightclub, 
Husband was convicted on charges of assault and using a deadly 
weapon.   
 After properly serving the Attorney General with a 
notice of intent to submit a claim under the Virgin Islands Tort 
Claims Act, V.I. Code tit. 33, § 3401 et seq., plaintiff filed a 
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suit in the district court on September 18, 1990.  The complaint 
named as defendants the owner of the nightclub, the Government of 
the Virgin Islands, and Husband.  The government was not served 
with the complaint until April 30, 1991.  
 In July 1991, the owner of the nightclub was dismissed 
on the plaintiff's stipulation.  Meanwhile, pretrial proceedings 
in the claim against Husband continued in the district court.   
 As of September 1992, the Attorney General's office had 
not responded to the complaint, and on September 18, 1992, 
plaintiff moved for default against the government.  There is no 
indication in the record that the government was ever given 
notice of the motion before the clerk entered the default on 
January 26, 1993. 
 On February 12, 1993, the Attorney General's office 
filed an untimely answer without obtaining leave of court.  The 
district court struck the answer on February 22, 1993 and 
directed that a hearing on damages would begin on March 29, 1993. 
 In the period between March 9, 1993 and March 24, 1993, 
the Attorney General's office filed motions to file an answer out 
of time, to set aside the default, and for judgment on the 
pleadings.  The trial judge denied all of these motions, thus 
rejecting the government's contention that no judgment by default 
could be entered under the governing Virgin Islands law.   
 The court conducted a hearing that was confined to the 
amount of damages the government would be required to pay. 
Plaintiff and one of his physicians testified on the extent of 
the physical and emotional injuries that were caused by the 
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incident at the nightclub.  Although a Deputy Attorney General 
cross-examined the witnesses, he did not produce any evidence. At 
the conclusion of the damages hearing, the district court entered 
a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $25,000.   
 The plaintiff's claim against the government is based 
on the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act.1  The statute is a limited 
waiver of the Virgin Islands' sovereign immunity conferred by the 
Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, 48 U.S.C. § 1541(b).  
See Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 193 
(3d Cir. 1984).2 
 One of the limitations on the government's conditional 
waiver can be found in V.I. Code tit. 33, § 3408.  This section 
provides that the government assumes liability with respect to 
personal injury "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of an employee . . . while acting within the scope of 
his office or employment, under circumstances where the 
Government of the Virgin Islands, if a private person, would be 
liable to the claimant . . . ."  Id. § 3408(a).  However, those 
provisions do not apply if the injury "is caused by the gross 
negligence of an employee . . . while acting within the scope of 
his office or employment."  Id. § 3408(b).   
                                                           
1The complaint also asserted damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but 
the Virgin Islands government is not subject to such suits, see 
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182 (1990); Brow v. Farrelly, 994 
F.2d 1027, 1037 (3d Cir. 1993), and that claim is not raised in 
this appeal. 
2For a discussion of the sovereign immunity of a U.S. Territory, 
see Ngiraingas, 495 U.S. at 203-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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 A further limitation of the government's conditional 
waiver can be found in section 3411(a):  "No judgment shall be 
granted on any claim against the [g]overnment . . . except upon 
such legal evidence as would establish liability against an 
individual or corporation in a court of law, and no judgment by 
default shall be entered against the [g]overnment."   No case 
law defines the meaning of "judgment by default" as that term is 
used in the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act.   
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are in effect in 
the Virgin Islands.  In moving for a default, plaintiff followed 
the procedures set out in Rule 55, which makes a distinction 
between an "entry of default" and a "judgment by default."  Rule 
55(a) allows the court clerk to enter a default against a party 
on its failure to plead or otherwise defend.  However, when the 
claim is unliquidated, plaintiff must apply to the court for a 
"judgment by default."  If it is necessary "to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by 
evidence," the court may conduct a hearing.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
55(b)(2).   
 Rule 55(e) provides that "[n]o judgment by default 
shall be entered against the United States . . . unless the 
claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(e).   However, 
because that subsection is expressly limited to the government of 
the United States, it is not applicable to the case at hand, and 
consequently, decisional law interpreting that subsection is not 
controlling.  Moreover, the clause beginning with "unless" is 
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conspicuously not present in the Virgin Islands statute.  Thus, 
the cases allowing the entry of a "default" against the federal 
government and granting relief to a plaintiff under the exception 
provided by that clause are not particularly helpful, even by 
analogy. 
 Plaintiff proceeded in the district court as if the 
Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 55 were compatible and complementary.  The language of 
the Tort Claims Act, however, is quite specific and unambiguously 
prohibits any judgment by default against the territorial 
government.   
 The Rules Enabling Act provides that the federal rules 
must not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."  28 
U.S.C. § 2072(b).  Rule 55(e), however, substantially restates 
the now-repealed last clause of 28 U.S.C. § 763 (action against 
the United States under the Tucker Act).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 
advisory committee's note; see also 10 Charles A. Wright et al., 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2702 (1983).  Because Rule 55(e) 
in a sense incorporates a statute addressing the limitation on 
the sovereign immunity of the United States, the Rule is not 
wholly procedural.   
 To the extent that the Virgin Islands waiver of 
sovereign immunity is flatly conditioned on the non-availability 
of a default judgment, the matter is one of substance and not 
procedure.  Applying Rule 55(e) to permit default judgments 
against the Virgin Islands government in the present case would 
significantly "enlarge" the substantive rights conferred on 
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claimants under section 3411(a) of the Tort Claims Act Therefore, 
where a conflict between Rule 55 and the substantive Virgin 
Islands statute exists, as here, the Rule must give way.3 
 Before presenting his testimony on damages in the 
district court, plaintiff argued that a judgment entered after a 
damages hearing would constitute a judgment on the merits, even 
though the government was prohibited from contesting its 
liability because of the default.  The district court accepted 
this reasoning, but we cannot agree that the clear statutory 
prohibition against a judgment by default may be so evaded. 
 The judgment against the government was grounded on two 
essential bases -- liability and damages.  Lacking either 
element, the judgment can have no validity under the Tort Claims 
Act.  In the case at hand, the default ruling on liability goes 
to the very heart of the judgment, despite the fact that a 
hearing was conducted to enable the government to contest the 
amount of damages.  The judgment here was not based on the merits 
of both liability and damages, but on damages only.  The 
judgment, therefore, is fatally deficient under the Virgin 
Islands Tort Claims Act.  
 The facts before us support the legislative decision to 
ban default judgments against the government.  The Attorney 
General's office was indeed negligent and inefficient in its case 
                                                           
3We are not presented here with the situation where a federal 
rule has merely an incidental effect on a substantive right and 
is "reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system 
of rules."  See Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 
(1987). 
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processing procedures by allowing so much time to elapse before 
it filed an answer.  However, the circumstances in which 
plaintiff was injured suggests that there may be serious 
questions about whether the government is liable.  There is 
reason to believe that the government might ultimately prevail if 
given a full opportunity to defend and present evidence.   
 In discussing a default against the federal government 
in a different context, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit explained:  "[Rule 55(e)] rests on the 
rationale that the taxpayers at large should not be subjected to 
the cost of a judgment entered as a penalty against a government 
official which comes as a windfall to the individual litigant." 
Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 491 (5th Cir. 1962).  In the 
present state of the record, we cannot determine whether the 
award to plaintiff would be a windfall, but we must recognize 
legitimate concerns for taxpayers who would be detrimentally 
affected by the entry of a judgment by default.   
 The problem in this case was apparently brought about 
by someone in the Attorney General's office who had placed the 
civil complaint in the file on the criminal case pending against 
defendant Husband.  Although efficient procedures can minimize 
the risk of such an occurrence, misfilings can occur in any 
office.  It may well be that the legislature had anticipated such 
human failings when it prohibited default judgments against the 
government.   
 The district court is not powerless to cope with delays 
such as occurred in this case.  We are confident that if the 
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court -- at the plaintiff's urging -- had called the delinquency 
to the attention of the Attorney General, an answer would have 
been forthcoming.  There is no evidence in the record to indicate 
that the Attorney General's office was being uncooperative or 
deliberately delaying disposition of the case.4  We expect that 
the Attorney General will improve the procedures in the office so 
that similar incidents of this nature will not occur in the 
future.  
 Because the territorial government had the power to 
completely retain its sovereign immunity and thus bar all relief 
to tort claimants, the legislature's decision to deny recovery 
based on default judgments is obviously defensible.  We conclude 
that a judgment entered after default on liability and following 
a contested hearing on damages is nevertheless a "judgment by 
default" prohibited in actions brought under the Virgin Islands 
Tort Claims Act.  See Concepcion v. Soto, 519 F.2d 405, 407 n.2 
(3d Cir. 1975). 
 We emphasize that our holding applies to the situation 
where the government has failed to appear or file an answer in 
response to a properly served complaint.  We do not consider in 
this case the circumstances where sanctions -- whether 
categorized as a default or simply having the effect of one --may 
                                                           
4Plaintiff opposed the government's motion to set aside the 
default, arguing:  "`After several demands, not only from my 
office but also from the Court, when this case was pending with 
no response from the government.  Default was the only avenue 
that we had.'"  Br. of Plaintiff-Appellee at 11-12 (quoting R. at 
18).  We have found nothing in the record to support this 
statement.   
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be imposed as a penalty for government conduct during the 
progress of litigation.  Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 
987, 998 (3d Cir. 1951) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 does 
not apply to sanctions for the government's failure to produce 
discovery materials), rev'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 Our holding is consistent with Anchorage Assocs. v. 
Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1990). In 
that case, we pointed out the difference between granting a 
default judgment and granting a motion for relief pursuant to a 
local rule upon the complete failure of a party to respond.  The 
defendant had failed to file an answer to a motion for summary 
judgment.  However, we held that delinquency was not sufficient 
to justify the entry of summary judgment in the absence of facts 
in the record to support the action on the merits.  Id. at 176.  
 Plaintiff suggests that if the default is found to be 
improper, then the finding on damages should be sustained to 
avoid retrial on that issue if liability is ultimately found 
against the government.  We decline to follow that suggestion 
because the limited scope of the hearing on damages did not 
permit inquiry into the potential effect of the settlements 
reached between plaintiff and the other two defendants, nor did 
it address issues of joint or several liability and primary or 
secondary liability.  
 Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
district court and will remand for a trial on both liability and 
damages.  
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